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CASENOTES
PRETENDING TO UPSET THE BALANCE: OLD CHIEF V.
UNITED STATES AND EXCLUSION OF PRIOR FELONY
CONVICTION EVIDENCE UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 403
I. INTRODUCTION
The story of an event is often more interesting and informa-
tive than the mere fact that the event occurred. Aesop's morals
would not be as captivating without the fables that accompany
them. The fables tell the reader a story embodying a moral
truth. On election night, the ballot tally proves which candidate
won, but the voter is interested more in the story of the cam-
paign trail that put the candidate in office rather than a naked
statistic comparing voting percentages. The story gives not only
the bare idea or fact; it mixes this bare idea or fact with the
supporting factual information, making it easier to understand.
The context of a trial provides another example when reli-
ance on the "story" is useful for understanding. Experienced
counsel will not present his evidence to the jury through a
laundry list of abstract legal principles, but will provide the
jury with a story of the events that combines both principle and
fact, which allows the jury to follow along. The details of the
events that led to the issue in question assist the jury in un-
derstanding and assessing the evidence presented. A finding
that a defendant stole corporate funds or murdered a victim
with requisite intent may be very difficult for the jury to deter-
mine without the facts underlying the charge. Under these
circumstances, the jury benefits from a story about the employ-
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ee who took, allegedly, five thousand dollars from the cash
register of the department store at the end of a shift and then
mysteriously quit, or a story concerning a botched drug deal
that ended when one of the dealers was shot in cold blood with
a pistol. In the trial context, the story of events pieces the
puzzle together so that the jury may assess the evidence and
understand how the evidentiary pieces fit.
In criminal proceedings, the prosecution is allowed generally
to satisfy its burden against the defendant and fulfill its evi-
dentiary requirements by choosing its own method of proof or
version of the "story."1 This prosecutorial element of choice is
expansive and has few restrictions.2 One such restriction, how-
ever, prohibits the prosecution from introducing past or "other"
acts3 that bear only on the defendant's character and, though
relevant, are not related directly to the case in question.4
1. "A party is not required to accept a judicial admission of his adversary, but
may insist on proving the fact." 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 397 (1996). See Parr v. United
States, 255 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1958) (stating that "the rule is to permit a party 'to
present to the jury a picture of the events [because a] substitute "naked admission
might . .. rob the evidence of much of its . . . weight") (quoting Dunning v. Maine
Central Railroad Co., 39 A. 352, 356 (Me. 1897)); see also Old Chief v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 644, 653 (1997) (stating that the standard rule is to entitle the prosecu-
tion to prove its case by evidence of its own choice); United States v. Gilman, 684
F.2d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that prosecution was entitled to prove conspir-
acy by its own probative evidence regardless of defendant's willingness to stipulate to
the existence of a conspiracy); United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680, 686 (8th Cir.
1970) (stating that the government in a criminal proceeding is not required to accept
a judicial admission by the defendant but has a right to offer proof).
2. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (requiring that admissible evidence be relevant); FED.
R. EVm. 403 (stating that where relevant evidence is more unfairly prejudicial than
probative, then it may be excluded); FED. R. EVID. 404 (stating that character evi-
dence is not admissible to prove conduct); FED. R. EVID. 802 (restricting admissibility
of hearsay evidence); see also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 n.8
(1948) (holding that prosecution may not provide evidence of prior criminal acts ex-
cept where the past criminal conviction is an element of the crime).
3. "Other" is defined as "different or distinct from that already mentioned; addi-
tional, or further," such that an "other act" as evidence is a presentation of conduct
outside, and in addition to, any evidence going to prove the case in chief. BLACK'S
LAw DIcTIoNARY 1101 (6th ed. 1990).
4. The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law,
specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such
facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable
perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is
irrelevant ... [but because] it is said to weigh too much with the jury
and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a general bad
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
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Evidence of a prior conviction demonstrates a particular type
of past act5 and is inadmissible as character evidence due to its
unduly prejudicial influence on the jury." Yet, Rule 404(b) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence permits the prosecution to intro-
duce prior convictions in a limited number of cases where the
past act offered is indicative of more than character evidence,
relates directly to the case in chief, and is not unduly prejudi-
cial.' In determining whether the evidence of a prior conviction
is admissible as part of the prosecutorial story, the trial court
judge, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403,8 must balance
the probative value9 of the evidence against its unfair prejudi-
charge. [Tihe practical experience [is] that its disallowance tends to pre-
vent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.
Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76 (footnotes omitted). See also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554, 560 (1967) (holding that prior conviction evidence is "generally recognized to
have potentiality for prejudice [and] it is usually excluded7); United States v. Jones,
67 F.3d 320, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that evidence of other crimes is always
prejudicial and diverts the jury's attention to the defendanes bad character) (citing
United States v. James, 555 F.2d 992, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
In these instances, character or past acts evidence would add elements to the
prosecution's "story" of the events that would be extraneous to the issues in question
and color the story with prejudicial overtones to the overwhelming detriment of the
defendant.
5. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove ... character").
6. See supra note 4. Unfair prejudice in a criminal context refers to the "capac-
ity of... relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground
different from proof specific to the offense charged." Old Chief, 117 S. Ct at 650.
Additionally, "evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a
risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant." Id at 652.
7. Prior acts or convictions may be admissible to show "proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent... ." FED. R. EVID. 404(b). See Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475 n.8 (stating a quali-
fication to the general inadmissibility of past convictions where the conviction is an
element of the offense). Admissibility of other acts requires a two part analysis which
first requires the evidence to be relevant for more than proof of character and, sec-
end, that the prejudicial value is not substantially greater than the probative value.
See United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1453 (1st Cir. 1992); see also United
States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160, 1172 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating a similar two-part anal-
ysis under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
8. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. . EviD. 403.
9. Probative evidence is that "having the effect of proof; tending to prove, or
actually proving." BLACKes LAW DIcTioNARY, 1203 (6th ed. 1990). Note that "proba-
tive! and "relevant' are distinguishable, such that evidence of a prior conviction may
be relevant to proving an element, while having very little if any probative value
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cial effect.'0 If, in its discretion, the court finds the evidence to
be unduly prejudicial, then the prior conviction may be inad-
missible, even though relevant."
In Old Chief v. United States,2 the Supreme Court inquired
whether an abuse of discretion occurred when a trial court
judge permitted, under Rule 403, prosecutorial evidence of not
only the existence of a prior conviction, but also its name and
nature, after the defendant offered to stipulate to the existence
of the prior offense.' 3 Although evidence of a prior conviction
was necessary to convict Old Chief of felon-in-possession charg-
es,'4 the Court questioned whether that evidence could include
the nature of the past felony or, in the alternative, whether
Rule 403 excluded categorically such a presentation as unfairly
prejudicial." The majority ruled that when the defendant
agrees to stipulate' a prior conviction element, and the prior
conviction element requires merely proof of status,"7 which ne-
because it may not actually have the effect of proof. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct at 652
(discussing the difference between Rule 401 "relevance" and Rule 403 "probative val-
ue").
10. See supra note 6.
11. See FED. R. EVID. 403. The trial judge has wide discretion to balance proba-
tive value against unfair prejudicial value in deciding admissibility. See United States
v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984); see also Garcia, 983 F.2d at 1173 (stating that a
judge has leeway in determining Rule 403 admissibility). On appeal, admission of
evidence under Rule 403 is adjudged by the abuse of discretion standard. See Abel,
469 U.S. at 55.
12. 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
13. See id. at 647.
14. Felon-in-possession charges are described under 18 U.S.C. § 922(gXl), which
reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person--(1) who has been convicted in
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ...
to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm!" 18 U.S.C. § 922(gXl). This section
replaced the repealed 18 U.S.C. § 1202(aX1). Note that prior felony convictions do not
include "antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other...
regulation of business practices [felonies]" or any State misdemeanor punishable by
two or fewer years incarceration. See Old Chief, 17 S. Ct. at 647.
15. While evidence of prior conviction satisfies Rule 404(b) when it tends to prove
a criminal element, the second prong of the test under Rule 403 may not be met if
the prior conviction's unfairly prejudicial value substantially outweighs its probative
value. See supra note 7.
16. For admission into evidence, a stipulation must "express a clear and un-
equivocal intention to remove the issues such that... it constitutes an offer to
stipulate" and the "concession must cover the necessary substantive ground to remove
the issues from the case." Garcia, 983 F.2d at 1174.
17. A status element is a "discrete and independent component of the crime" that
shows class membership and is independent of the facts leading to membership.
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gates the jury's need to know of the conviction's nature, the
court abuses its discretion under Rule 403 if it allows the pros-
ecution to present evidence showing the name and nature of
the past offense.'"
The questions that Old Chiefs majority opinion raise are
peculiar. First, as the dissent remarked, either the majority
failed to properly apply Rule 403 or, alternately, Rule 403 may
not have force when the prior conviction is an element of the
offense. 9 Second, the majority appears to have introduced a
"less prejudicial alternative" test under Rule 403 that examines
holistically evidentiary possibilities in order to exclude evidence
that carries a "greater risk" of being unfairly prejudicial."
This test, however, finds no explicit reference in the history or
text of Rule 403 and, possibly, no implicit support. Further, the
holding violates the general rule permitting the prosecution to
present evidence to prove its own story,2' while making a
judge's discretionary ruling under Rule 403 a mechanical pro-
cess for "status" elements.'
Greater questions remain unanswered in determining the
broader ramifications of Old Chiefs analysis of the Rule 403
balancing test when a defendant's stipulation is a factor. While
issues of what constitutes a "status" element' and the general
power of the defense to force both the court and opposing coun-
sel to accept stipulations under Rule 403 could extend possibly
to other offenses, Old Chief provides a narrow, circumscribed
United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1994)). The felon-in-possession prior conviction element
is a status element showing membership in the class of convicted felons under 18
U.S.C. § 922(gX1) and does not require a demonstration of the criminal acts that led
to membership. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 653.
18. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655.
19. See id. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
20. The majority suggested that the proper Rule 403 balancing test will weigh
probative value and unfair prejudice by comparing evidentiary items with available
substitutes, such that the "probative value of an item of evidence [may decrease]
when faced with less risky alternative proof going to the same point." Id. at 659.
21. See id- at 658 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
22. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 5250 (1978) (stating that Rule 403 "discretion' means that
"no hard and fast rules are laid down" and that "no mechanical solution is offered")
(citing United States v. Fierson, 419 F.2d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 1969)).
23. See supra note 17.
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rule that should have little effect outside felon-in-possession
cases.' While seemingly expansive, the majority holding is
tailored narrowly to the specific offense' and fails to mandate
a categorical exclusion of the nature of prior convictions in all
cases during which such evidence may find admission." In-
stead, the opinion shows truly that Rule 403 is discretionary
and presents a mere tautology for future decisions.
This note examines those issues in order to determine the
scope of the Old Chief decision. After a brief explanation of the
history of Rule 403 balancing, this note provides a foundation
for understanding modern cases dealing with defendant stipula-
tions by exploring the early cases addressing the prosecution's
right to tell its evidentiary story over the defendant's proffered
stipulations. Court decisions from the 1970s to the present,
particularly cases concerning felon-in-possession charges, com-
prise the next section. The note then provides an analysis of
both the majority and minority opinions in Old Chief concern-
ing the effect of a stipulation on the prosecution's proof and
how Rule 403 should be applied to stipulations of status ele-
ments. Finally, the note concludes that Old Chief provides a
limited holding that has not defeated the prosecution's ability to
tell its story, because the Rule 403 balancing test favoring de-
fendant stipulations is applicable only in specific instances.
H. RULE 403, PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE AND STIPULATIONS
A. Rule 403
Prior to ratification of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,
exclusion of evidence based on unfair prejudice to a party was
not so much a rule as an amalgam of judicial responses to
various scenarios. While judges excluded relevant evidence
24. The majority stated that in most cases a "Rule 403 objection ... generally
cannot prevail over the Governments choice to offer evidence showing guilt and all
the circumstances surrounding the offense." Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651.
25. "While our discussion has been general because of the general wording of
Rule 403, our holding is limited to cases involving proof of felon status." Id. at 651
n.7.
26. "[If... there were a justification for receiving evidence of the nature of the
prior acts on some issue other than status . . . Rule 404(b) guarantees the opportuni-
ty to seek its admission." Id. at 655.
27. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note. The Committee noted that
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that produced unfair prejudice against the defendant, confused
the issues, misled the jury, or wasted time," no specific stan-
dards existed to guide the judiciary in a determination of unfair
prejudice beyond balancing the probative value and need for
evidence against the probable harm of admitting the evidence.
Thus, courts excluded evidence that was relevant if other
circumstances existed which created greater harm than benefit,
though the circumstances were not provided in a set of objec-
tive rules.
When the Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated, the
Supreme Court drafted Rule 403, which read as follows: "Al-
though relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consider-
ations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.' 9 The new rule noted the traditional
concerns of the Court, but it left the admission of unfair preju-
dicial evidence to judicial discretion.0 The new rule, like the
common law tradition, failed to provide an objective set of cir-
cumstances under which evidence was to be excluded. Instead,
Rule 403 stated explicitly broad categories under which relevant
evidence may be excluded and mandated an analysis that re-
quires a balancing of probative and prejudicial value.3
In addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence contained Rule
404(b), which permitted evidence of other crimes under limited
circumstances. Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
Rule 403 was designed "as a guide for the handling of situations for which no specif-
ic rules have been formulated." Id.
28. See ik The Committee defined "unfair prejudice" as an "undue tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emo-
tional one." Id.
29. FED. R. EVID. 403.
30. Based on the advisory committee's note, Rule 403 mandates a court balancing
test to determine the admissibility of evidence as to probative value and unfair preju-
dicial effect, though the decision of admissibility under Rule 403 remains discretion-
ary. See id.; see also supra note 27 (stating that Rule 403 was meant to be a guide).
31. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mis-
take or accident. 2
Although evidence of other crimes was regarded as highly
prejudicial to the party against whom it was offered, the rule
provided a narrow exception when such evidence was also pro-
bative of a matter at issue other than character.s" Admission
of evidence indicating other crimes was premised upon compli-
ance with not only Rule 404(b), but also passing the Rule 403
balancing test.' The Rule 403 balancing test was intended to
be conducted with a wary eye towards the availability of alter-
native means of proof and "other factors appropriate for making
decisions of this kind under Rule 403."85
B. Early History of Prior Conviction Evidence and Stipulations
In a number of instances, the prosecution in a criminal case
may find an opportunity to introduce evidence of the
defendant's prior conviction record. 6 A prior conviction falls
within Rule 404(b) restrictions, which exclude evidence of other
32. FED. R. EvM. 404(b).
33. See id., advisory committee's note.
34. See id.
35. Id. These decisions are based on discretion in view of a number of factors
including, but not limited to the following- probative worth, evidentiary need, suffi-
ciency of other evidence, alternative proof, strength of proof, prejudice, time required
to prove, nature of the proof, and motivation of offeror. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, 3u-
pra note 22. Courts are to eschew any mechanical application of Rule 404(b) in place
of a more subjective assessment of the evidence to ensure that relevant evidence is
admitted while lessening prejudicial impact that necessarily -accompanies other crimes
evidence. See id.
Note that admission of other crimes evidence is a three step process that in-
volves: (1) meeting one of the nine categories in Rule 404(b); (2) a relevancy determi-
nation under Rules 401 and 402; and (3) a balancing under Rule 403 to determine
that the probative value is greater than any unfair prejudicial value. See Emerging
Problems under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1991 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 48 (David A.
Schlueter ed., 2d. ed.) (discussing the Supreme Courtes holding in Huddleston v. Unit-
ed States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988)). Thus, admission under Rule 404(b) often will hinge
upon the mandatory Rule 403 balancing test and a determination of whether the ad-
mission of evidence of other crimes is unfairly prejudicial.
36. While not admissible to show a "criminal" character under Rule 404(b), prior
convictions could be used to demonstrate that the events underlying the conviction
were part of a common and continuing course of action, motivation, status as a ca-
reer criminal, or even represent an element of the offense itself. See FED. R. EVID.
404.
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crimes. Thus, evidence of a prior conviction must fall within
Rule 404(b)'s exceptions, constitute relevant evidence, and pass
Rule 403 balancing in order to gain admission.37 Once admit-
ted, the prosecution may tell its story concerning the prior
conviction and include the details, type, and nature of the of-
fense underlying the conviction.
In an effort to block efforts by the prosecution to introduce
the details of a prior conviction, a criminal defendant may at-
tempt to stipulate that a prior conviction exists. The stipulation
then acts as an admission to the prior conviction, while pre-
venting the jury from hearing the nature of the conviction and
possibly making improper considerations based on such evi-
dence. In effect, the stipulation removes the prosecution's ability
to tell a story about the prior conviction by providing an asser-
tion that such a conviction exists. The question that remains,
however, is whether an offer to stipulate constitutes a factor
under Rule 403 when conducting a Rule 404(b) admissibility
test and prevents the prosecution from telling its story.'
Before the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975,
and for some time thereafter, a defendant's stipulation was
taken by the trial court with some levity and usually without
success. Generally, a court rejected a defendant's stipulation in
favor of the prosecution's need to tell a continuous evidentiary
story. The balance of prejudice and probativeness often fell to
the side of the latter based on need and the alleged inadequacy
of a stipulation to fully meet the prosecution's burden of proof.
In the 1958 case of Parr v. United States,39 the Fifth Circuit
upheld the right of the prosecution to refuse the defendant's
stipulation to an element of criminal interstate transport of ob-
37. See supra note 35.
38. Both the prosecution's story and a stipulation constitute alternative proofs of
the prior conviction. When applying Rule 404(b), the court will examine the availabili-
ty of alternative proofs. See supra note 35. Since the story contains more detail than
the bare stipulation, the court will consider issues surrounding this extra information,
including waste of time, prejudicial value, need, and strength of the evidence for
proving the factual proposition that the prior conviction goes to prove. See id The
defendantis hope is that the extra information will prove unfairly prejudicial under
the Rule 403 balancing test, denying the prosecution the ability to tell its story, and
leaving only the naked stipulation before the jury untainted with knowledge of the
conviction's nature.
39. 255 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1958).
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scene films.' The court held that a party is not required to
accept the admission by his adversary, but may insist on prov-
ing the facts in his own manner.41 Otherwise, the party may
lose the weight and effect of the evidence by permitting the
adversary to remove the surrounding facts, leaving only the
naked admission.42
Eight years later, in Spencer v. Texas,' the Supreme Court
held that while evidence of a prior conviction is potentially
prejudicial and, usually, must be excluded, the evidence is ad-
missible when it is probative." When the prior conviction is a
criminal element that the prosecution must prove, evidence of
the past act is both probative and admissible.45 The decision
upheld the prior ruling of Michelson v. United States ,4 in
which the Court stated that while prior convictions, generally,
were inadmissible as character evidence, the rule did not apply
when the prior conviction constituted an element of the offense
and was not introduced merely to show character.
1. Prior conviction stipulations in the 1970s
In the 1970s, a line of felon-in-possession cases followed the
United States v. Brickey" decision that the prosecution is enti-
tled to prove its own case regardless of any offer by the defen-
dant to stipulate the existence of the conviction element.49 Ad-
40. The court ruled that the prosecution was not required to accept the
defendant's stipulation that the films were lewd and obscene, and instead, allowed
evidence showing the film's content since a party is allowed "to present to the jury a
picture of the events relied upon.' Id. at 88 (citations omitted).
41. See id.
42. See id. (quoting Dunning v. Maine Central Railroad Co., 39 A. 352, 356 (Me.
1897)).
43. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
44. See id. at 560.
45. See id
46. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
47. See id. at 475-76.
48. 426 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1970) (holding that the prosecution could present evi-
dence, over the defense's objections, showing personal expenditures of money taken in
a fraudulent scheme in order to show a scheme to defraud).
49. See id at 685-86; United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735 (3rd Cir. 1979)
(holding that the prosecution was not required to accept defendant's stipulated offer
of prior felony conviction as proof); United States v. Blackburn, 592 F.2d 300 (6th
Cir. 1979) (holding that the government was not required to accept the defendant's
240
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ditionally, through the middle of the decade, several cases also
allowed the prosecution to present multiple past convictions to
show the prior felony element. 0 In general, a defendant could
not require the prosecution to accept either stipulation of ad-
mission to a prior conviction5' or stipulation of the existence of
the element.5 2 While some cases recognized the possible preju-
stipulation of prior felony conviction in a felon-in-possession case); United States v.
Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that while the prosecution does not
have an unequivocal right to refuse all stipulations, the government, generally, is not
required to accept such offers); United States v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14 (6th Cir.
1976) (holding that the government was not required to accept defendant's stipulation
to a lesser prior felony conviction in a felon-in-possession case); United States v.
Smith, 520 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that the prosecution was not required to
accept the defendant's stipulations in lieu of its own proof in a felon-in-possession
case). But see United States v. Poore, 594 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding that once
the prosecution has accepted a stipulation, the court cannot admit prosecutorial evi-
dence excluded by the stipulation); United States v. Spletzer, 535 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.
1976) (holding that Rule 403 prohibits the government's refusal of a stipulation where
the government's own evidence has little prosecutorial need and the evidence is not
probative).
50. See Burkhart, 545 F.2d at 15 (allowing the government to present evidence of
two prior convictions to satisfy the prior felony element of felon-in-possession offense);
Smith, 520 F.2d at 548 (finding that the prosecution was not limited to presenting
only one prior felony conviction to prove the conviction element in a felon-in-posses-
sion case).
51. A defendant is not allowed to %stipulate" out of the element, which means the
defendant cannot offer to concede the element so that the jury is never appraised
that the element even exists. At a minimum, the jury must be informed by a stipula-
tion that the defendant does have a prior felony record, although not necessarily the
type of felony conviction. See Williams, 612 F.2d at 740 (holding that a defendant's
stipulation cannot modify a prior conviction element so as to remove it entirely from
the jury's consideration); Brinklow, 560 F.2d at 1006 (deciding that the prosecution is
not required to accept a stipulation that will remove completely the issue of a past
conviction from the jury); Burkhart, 545 F.2d at 15 (stating that a defendant could
not stipulate the lesser of two past felony convictions in order to altogether remove
evidence of a past conviction from the jury).
52. Such a stipulation does not remove the element from the jury's consideration,
but does restrict the type of evidence that the prosecution can provide the jury in
proving the prior conviction element. Most notably, the stipulation removes the ability
of the government to present evidence of the name and nature of the prior felony
and instead requires the jury to accept an admission that the defendant has been
convicted of a prior felony without any knowledge of the facts underlying that offense.
This issue is the principal problem in stipulations to a prior conviction element. See
supra note 49; see also Poore, 594 F.2d at 42 (discussing the effect of an accepted
stipulation in limiting prosecutorial evidence).
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dicial effect of the evidence under Rule 403,' most courts held
that probative value outweighed any unfair prejudice."
Five years before the Federal Rules of Evidence were enact-
ed, the Eighth Circuit decided Brickey, a case that later would
serve as the cornerstone for a line of cases rejecting defendant
stipulations in favor of the prosecution's need to tell a continu-
ous story.55 Charged with mail fraud, Brickey objected to the
prosecution's presentation of evidence demonstrating personal
expenditures made by Brickey with diverted funds. The expen-
ditures included a diamond ring, a pool, and money paid on
Brickey's home. After Brickey argued that the evidence was
irrelevant and conceded a diversion of funds, the trial court
nonetheless permitted the government to present evidence of
the expenses to show that funds were diverted through a
scheme to defraud." The basis for the decision was that a par-
ty is not required to accept an opponent's admission, but may
demand his own right to offer proof. 7
The Eighth Circuit relied upon the Brickey decision a few
years later in United States v. Smith." Smith was charged
with being a felon-in-possession59 and the prosecution intro-
duced the trial records of Smith's prior convictions for armed
robbery and felon-in-possession. Although Smith offered to stip-
ulate that the "jury might take it as established that [he] had a
felony record" or that the armed robbery offense was the basis
for the prior felon-in-possession conviction, the trial court ad-
53. See Spletzer, 535 F.2d at 956 (finding that Rule 403 may restrict the
prosecution's presentation of evidence).
54. See supra note 49.
55. See United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1970). The Eighth Cir-
cuit relied upon the Brickey decision in deciding Smith, 520 F.2d at 548, and United
States v. Bruton, 647 F.2d 818, 825 (8th Cir. 1981). The First Circuit referred to
Bruton in United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1989), in upholding
the prosecution's right to refuse a defendant's stipulation. Later, the First Circuit
attacked Brickey and its line of cases, including its own decision in Collamore, in
United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994), in which a prosecutorial duty to
accept stipulations was formulated.
56. See Brickey, 426 F.2d at 685-86.
57. See id. (citing Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1958)).
58. 520 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1975).
59. The charge was "having unlawfully received a firearm that had moved in in-
terstate commerce" under 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(aXl) (1994), the precursor to the
modem felon-in-possession statue. See supra note 14.
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mitted the felony record.' Relying on Brickey, the court of ap-
peals upheld the admission, stating that the prosecution was
not to be limited by defendant's stipulations.6 Further, the
court held that the lack of a jury instruction on the limited use
of the evidence was not reversible error since no affirmative
duty existed for the trial court to include such an instruction
without a request from the defendant.62
Several other circuits in the 1970s followed the Eighth
Circuit's holding that a defendant's stipulation did not restrict
the prosecution's presentation of evidence concerning prior con-
victions. In 1976, the Sixth Circuit relied upon United States v.
Smith when it ruled in United States v. Burkhart' that a
defendant's stipulation could not limit the prosecution's choice
of prior convictions to prove the prior felony element in a felon-
in-possession case.' In Burkhart, the defendant attempted to
stipulate that he had been convicted of the lesser of two prior
offenses. The court, however, refused summarily to require the
government to accept the offer."
In turn, Burkhart provided the foundation in United States v.
Blackburn.' In Blackburn, the Sixth Circuit held that an offer
to stipulate would not prevent the government from introducing
the nature of a prior offense. While the concurring opinion in
Blackburn disagreed that the Burkhart rule should apply,67 the
opinion noted that the admission was harmless because such
admission was necessary to rebut the defense of innocent pos-
60. See Smith, 520 F.2d at 547.
61. See id at 548. Additionally, the court held that the stipulation would not act
to restrict the government's choice of prior convictions to prove the element, such that
the prosecution was allowed to rely on either the armed robbery or felon-in-possession
records to prove its case. See id.
62. See id. at 549.
63. 545 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1976).
64. See id. at 15.
65. If the stipulation had required acceptance by the prosecution, then the de-
fendant strategically would have blocked proof of either conviction from going to the
jury. See id. Instead, the court ruled that the government was not only not bound by
the stipulation, but was not limited to proof of only one prior conviction. See id.
66. 592 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1979) (refusing to overturn Burkhart).
67. "MDisclosure of the nature of prior felony convictions makes it difficult to as-
sure an accused a fair and impartial jury. Without doubt, it places an unnecessary
burden upon the presumption of innocence .... Therefore, I cannot agree that the
court should adhere to the Burkhart rule." Id. at 301 (DeMascio, J., concurring).
1998] 243
UNiVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:231
session and, therefore, would be admissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence."
The Third and Tenth Circuits also joined the Eighth Circuit
concerning defendant stipulations to prior conviction evidence.
Relying in part on Brickey, the Third Circuit held in United
States v. Williams69 that the defendant could not require the
prosecution to accept his stipulation regarding a prior conviction
such that felony status would not be admitted in argument or
jury instructions. The court cited to the prosecution's right to
offer its own proof and refused to recognize a duty to accept the
proffered stipulation.70 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit, while not
citing to the Eighth Circuit opinions, held in United States v.
Brinklow7' that a defendant's stipulation to remove prior con-
viction evidence from the jury could not bind the prosecution
when the conviction was an element of the offense.72 Thus, a
defendant charged with interstate possession of explosives by a
convicted felon could not stipulate away the prior offenses and
remove the elements from prosecutorial proof."
Several circuits in the 1970s, however, imposed limits on
Brickey's rule permitting the prosecution to choose its own
evidence. In United States v. Spletzer,74 the Fifth Circuit held
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a conviction
and confinement for bank robbery to demonstrate that the ac-
cused was a prior felon who had escaped from prison.75 After
the defendant provided a sworn admission of the conviction, the
government nonetheless was permitted to introduce the full
record of the bank robbery conviction. While noting Brickey's
68. See id (relying upon FED. R. EVID. 609(a) and 404(b)).
69. 612 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1979).
70. The stipulation in question would have prevented the jury from hearing any
evidence concerning the prior conviction and also would have permitted the defendant
to modify the elements of the felon-in-possession statute by removing them from jury
consideration. See id. at 740.
71. 560 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977).
72. See id. at 1006; see also supra note 51.
73. The Brinklow court was hesitant to grant a wholesale refusal to the prose-
cution concerning stipulations. It stated that the government did not have an "un-
equivocal right" to refuse all stipulations and sided with the general rule of prosecu-
torial choice of evidence based on the essential need for the prior conviction element.
Brinklow, 560 F.2d at 1006.
74. 535 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1976).
75. See id. at 955-56.
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general rule permitting a party to refuse an adversary's stip-
ulations, the court held that the full record of the prior convic-
tion was not needed given the sworn admission." Since there
was no prosecutorial need for the evidence and the full record
was irrelevant,"7 a balancing test should have demonstrated
that the prejudicial value of the full record substantially out-
weighed its probative value."
Analogously, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Poore"9
held that the admission of evidence concerning a prior convic-
tion for handgun possession was admitted erroneously to prove
the prior conviction element of the felon-in-possession statute."
After the defendant stipulated to the prior offense and asked
the court to strike the nature of the crime from the indictment,
the court refused and the defendant alleged an abuse of discre-
tion."' Refusing to consider Smith as persuasive authority for
the prosecution's right to prove its own case, the court held
that the stipulation satisfied the conviction element, and that
the prejudice contained in the conviction's nature should have
led the lower court to strike the language upon stipulation. 2
While recognizing that the prosecution could use the nature of
the offense without a stipulation or where the evidence demon-
strated more than the element in question, the court found that
the evidence demonstrated only the prior conviction element
and that the stipulation prevented the court from admitting the
nature of the past offense.'e
76. See id.
77. In actuality, the full record would be relevant to prove prior conviction status,
though the probative weight may be low. Note that the relevancy and probativeness
tests under prior conviction evidence are separate determinations. See supra notes 9
and 35.
78. See Spletzer, 535 F.2d at 955-56.
79. 594 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1979).
80. See id. at 40-41.
81. See id.
82. In this case, the prior conviction for possession of a handgun was substan-
tially similar to the offense charged such that it would have been difficult for the
jury not to consider the nature of the past offense as relevant to deciding a similar
offense. See i at 41-42. Additionally, the court held that a limiting instruction was
inadequate to alleviate the prejudice of the nature of the conviction. See id
83. See id at 42-43.
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2. Prior Conviction Stipulations in the 1980s
In the 1980s, stipulations for felon-in-possession cases were
considered more fully, but the rules remained much the same.
While a stipulation to prior conviction was regarded as suffi-
cient to satisfy the element" and presented a factor in Rule
403 balancing," the trial court still maintained wide discretion
under Rule 403 and, usually, held in favor of the general rule
allowing the prosecution to prove its own case.86 Evidence of
multiple past convictions was allowed" and, at most, stipula-
tions created a non-binding "less restrictive alternative" factor if
the court limited the prosecution's presentation of evidence.s
Additionally, the First Circuit ruled that a defendant could not
seek bifurcation of felon-in-possession elements to exclude evi-
dence of prior conviction. 9
84. "M[Proffered stipulation that [defendant] has been convicted of a prior felony
was sufficient" for 18 U.S.C. § 922(gX1) prior conviction element. United States v.
Pirovolos, 844 F.2d 415, 420 (7th Cir. 1988).
85. See United States v. O'Shea, 724 F.2d 1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding
that a stipulation diminishes the probative value of a full conviction record offered by
the prosecution to prove a prior conviction element and that a stipulation is one
factor in Rule 403 balancing).
86. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 464, 470 (1984) (holding that district
courts were given wide latitude in determining admissibility under Rule 403); United
States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that "even in the face of
an offer to stipulate [a prior conviction for felon-in-possession charges], the govern-
ment may choose to present evidence on the one felony necessary to prove the crime
charged"); United States v. Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
the prosecution had the right to refuse stipulations of past conduct tending to prove
elements for conspiracy charges); United States v. Bruton, 647 F.2d 818, 825 (8th Cir.
1981) (holding that, for felon-in-possession cases, the government is not required to
accept defendant stipulations on prior felony conviction).
87. See Collamore, 868 F.2d at 29 (stating that while the prosecution did not
have an absolute right to introduce multiple prior felony convictions to prove a con-
viction element, it may introduce cumulative evidence subject to the trial court's dis-
cretion); Bruton, 647 F.2d at 825 (holding that jury knowledge of a defendant's prior
two-count indictment, where a stipulation was offered to admit to a one-count indict-
ment, was not in error since the government's proof generally is not limited to show-
ing only one prior felony).
88. A "proffered stipulation .. . [is] one factor to be considered in the Rule 403
balancing process." O'Shea, 724 F.2d at 1517 (holding that a stipulation may decrease
the probative value of other evidence that carries a greater risk of prejudice, though
circumstances may decrease the value of a stipulation itself).
89. A bifurcation occurs where the defendant attempts to have the jury decide
solely on the possession element of a felon-in-possession indictment before the prose-
cution can present evidence on the prior conviction element. The action excludes evi-
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Several decisions in the early years of the 1980s revealed the
courts' willingness to perpetuate the prosecution's right to re-
fuse a defendant's stipulation. In 1981, the Eighth Circuit held
fast to its decisions in Brickey and Smith when it decided that
the defendant in United States v. Bruton"° was not entitled to
have his stipulation to a prior conviction accepted.9 On four
separate occasions, the prosecution exposed the jury to the prior
conviction evidence, including multiple charges for being a fel-
on-in-possession of firearms and explosives, despite the
defendant's offer to stipulate the convictions. The court ruled
that the prosecution could refuse to accept the stipulation in
lieu of its own proof, and also that the government was entitled
to prove multiple prior convictions even though the statute
required only proof of one.9" The basis for the decision was
that no prejudice was found in the jury's knowledge of the prior
convictions stemming from a two-count indictment when the
statute required proof of prior conviction as an element.
In the United States v. O'Shea 4 and United States v.
Pirovolos," the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits, respectively,
addressed defendant stipulations to the prior conviction element
of felon-in-possession charges. In O'Shea, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the defendant's offer to stipulate prior convictions for
illegal possession of firearms and interstate auto theft dimin-
ished the probativeness of the prosecution's conviction evidence,
but that a stipulation is only one factor in Rule 403 balanc-
ing.6 The O'Shea court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the evidence since circumstances
demonstrated that the evidence would have been introduced for
other aspects of the case and because the court was not bound
to require the prosecution to accept the least prejudicial alter-
native.97 Similarly, in Pirovolos, the Seventh Circuit held that
dence of prior conviction during the possession phase of the trial and such evidence is
disallowed generally. See Collamore, 868 F.2d at 26.
90. 647 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1981).
91. See id. at 825.
92. See id. (citing United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680, 686 (8th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 1975)).
93. See id.
94. 724 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1984).
95. 844 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1988).
96. See O'Shea, 724 F.2d at 1517.
97. See i&
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while the prosecution's prior conviction evidence should have
been excluded based on the defendant's stipulation to the prior
offense element, the admission was harmless since the evidence
would have tended to prove other matters in the case."5 The
Pirovolos court affirmed the defendant's conviction since the
error in admission was not prejudicial, as it pertained to proof
beyond prior conviction status."
Relying on the rich history of precedent concerning defendant
stipulations, the decision in United States v. Collamore1" ana-
lyzed offers to stipulate where no such offer existed. Collamore
had eight prior convictions for burglary and robbery. He at-
tempted to bifurcate the trial into hearings regarding the pos-
session and prior conviction elements upon notice that the gov-
ernment sought to introduce at least three of his prior convic-
tions. 01 While the court rejected the defendant's motion to bi-
furcate the trial since it would prevent the prosecution from
proving its case, the court also stated that the mere absence of
a stipulation did not afford the government free reign to intro-
duce cumulative evidence concerning prior convictions."° The
holding provided explicitly that the prior conviction evidence
may be unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 even when the
convictions went to prove the prior felony element and were in
the absence of the defendant's stipulation."
3. Prior Conviction Stipulations in the 1990s
During the early 1990s, courts began to take divergent views
on stipulations to prior convictions and Rule 403. While cases
continued to support prosecutorial refusal of stipulations,04
98. See Pirovolos, 844 F.2d at 420.
99. See id.
100. 868 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1989).
101. See id. at 25-26.
102. See id. at 28 (citing United States v. Bruton, 647 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1981),
United States v. Blackburn, 592 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1979), and United States v.
Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1976), in support of its contention that the prosecu-
tion reserved the right to present its own evidence over a stipulation).
103. See id. at 29-30. Note that the multiple prior convictions were not relevant
merely to prove the element, but were intended to enable the prosecution to seek an
enhanced sentence. See id. at 26.
104. See United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding, in
a felon-in-possession case, that the prosecution's burden of proof is not relieved by a
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they also began to recognize the possible risk of prejudice and
Rule 403 implications. °5 In United States v. Breitkreutz, °c
the court held that a stipulation had no place in Rule 403
balancing.' 7 The court, however, held that the rule limits the
prosecution to evidence of only one prior conviction because
cumulative evidence of multiple past offenses would be unduly
prejudicial."'u While a defendant could not stipulate out of the
element," 9 his offer now had some weight as a factor under
Rule 403 in limiting portions of the prosecution's arguments.
In Breitkreutz, the Ninth Circuit followed the First Circuit's
analysis in Collamore. The trial court allowed the prosecution,
over the defense's objections and offer to stipulate, to prove
Breitkreutz had been convicted of three separate offenses prior
to the felon-in-possession charge."0 On appeal, Breitkreutz
challenged both the admission of any of the convictions over his
stipulation and the admission of multiple convictions. On the
first challenge, the court stated that an offer to stipulate does
not remove the issue from the jury's consideration and that the
prosecution should be permitted to prove its own case in light
of this burden."' The court denied vehemently that a stipula-
stipulation of prior conviction and the government is not precluded from charging and
proving the element regardless of stipulation); United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650,
656 (1st Cir. 1990) (relying on Collamore in ruling that the government's proof of
prior conviction is not restricted by a stipulation).
105. See United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 634, 638 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that
prior conviction evidence is generally unfairly prejudicial to show only felon status,
though it may be admissible as proof of other elements); United States v. Dockery,
955 F.2d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that the prosecution's right to present evi-
dence is always subject to Rule 403 discretion). Additionally, courts began to empha-
size the use of the two step procedure in admission of prior conviction evidence. See
United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160, 1172 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing the two-step
application of Rules 404 and 403 to prior conviction evidence); United States v.
Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1453 (1st Cir. 1992) (discussing "other acts" and prior con-
viction evidence admissibility test).
106. 8 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1993).
107. "A stipulation is not proof.... [Ut's a partial amendment to the defendant's
plea, a means of precluding any and all proof on a particular issue . .. [and] thus
has no place in the Rule 403 balancing process." Id. at 691-92.
108. "[The balance between probative value and unfair prejudice [under Rule 403]
shifts dramatically against the introduction of the subsequent felonies once the gov-
ernment proves up [sic] one .... [P]roof of... other[s]... [is] cumulative
and ... likely to fail ... [under] Rule 403 ... [since they] add [ I little of proba-
tive value." Id. at 692.
109. See supra note 51.
110. See Breitkreutz 8 F.3d at 689-90.
111. See id at 690-91 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69-70 (1991), in
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tion is an alternative means of proof weighed in Rule 403 bal-
ancing and succinctly stated that a stipulation is not proof at
all.'12 In contrast, the court held that presentation of cumula-
tive prior convictions, as in Collamore, increased the risk of
prejudice without a concomitant increase in probative value
such that the multiple convictions failed to pass Rule 403."'
In turn, this finding led to reversal."4
In United States v. Donlon,"5 the First Circuit relied on its
prior holding in Collamore to reject the defendant's contention
that his stipulation restricted the prosecution's proof of prior
conviction status."6 After police found a pistol in Doilon's
home while responding to a domestic dispute call, enforcement
officials discovered that Donlon had a prior felony record and
charged him with being a felon-in-possession. At trial, Donlon
offered to stipulate his previous conviction, but was rejected by
the prosecution which proceeded to provide evidence of the
conviction's nature."7 On appeal, Donlon's contention that the
prosecution should have been barred from introducing its evi-
dence was rejected when the court of appeals relied on
Collamore in holding that the government is entitled to prove
the elements in its own fashion."8
support of and distinguishing United States v. Poore, 594 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1979), as
inapposite under the facts).
112. See id. at 691-92 ("[Tlhe Rule 403 balance would tip against the prosecution's
evidence because it inevitably would have little if any probative value beyond that of
the stipulation.").
113. See id. at 692-93.
114. See id.
115. 909 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1990).
116. See id. at 656.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 656 (citing United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir.
1989)).
Note that in 1993, the First Circuit warned prosecutors against continuing to
engage in introducing cumulative evidence that proved highly prejudicial to the defen-
dants. See United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 634 (1st Cir. 1993). In Williams, the
prosecution insisted on using statements of the accused pertaining to his prior mur-
der convictions in order to prove past felony convictions, rather than relying on other
available evidence already in court concerning convictions for drug conspiracy in con-
junction with the use of a firearm. While the "murderer" statement was held not to
be prejudicial since it would have been admissible for other reasons beyond proving
prior felony status, the court cautioned the use of bad acts evidence that served to
inflame the jury and was only marginally related to the events in issue. See id. at
638 ("It comes with ill grace to introduce marginally justifiable evidence and then to
defend its use by arguing that there was so much evidence of guilt that any error
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C. Recent Cases
In recent years, courts of appeal have taken differing views
on trial court admission of prior conviction evidence in felon-in-
possession cases. In United States v. Gilliam,"9 the Second
Circuit held that evidence of a prior conviction cannot be undu-
ly prejudicial under Rule 403 if it is an element.' Further,
allowing a stipulation to remove evidence from the case is
harmful to the jury's function of assessing the facts before
it." 1 While a stipulation excludes some evidence from the ju-
ry, the stipulation does not remove the uncontested element
itself from jury consideration.' Yet, the court also remarked
that the underlying nature of the past conviction was irrelevant
to demonstrate that a prior conviction existed.' 3 The court
appeared to be locked in the horns of a dilemma, unable to
decide where, or even if, to draw a line between total exclusion
of evidence by stipulation or total admissibility of all facts per-
taining to the prior conviction.'
would be harmless.").
119. 994 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1993). The defendant in Gilliam argued that the trial
court erred in not requiring the prosecution to accept his stipulation to prior felony
convictions in a felon-in-possession charge; however, the defendant was attempting to
stipulate the entire element, and not just his admission to his felony record, in an
attempt to prevent the jury from learning of his conviction. See id. at 100.
120. See id. (stating that evidence of prior conviction is not prejudicial where the
conviction is an element and tends to prove the fact that justifies its admission).
121. A stipulation creates "harm to the judicial process and the role of the jury in
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused as charged ... and removes from
the jury's consideration an element of the crime." Id. at 101. Indeed, a stipulation
"concede[s] and strips] away" jury consideration even though the jury still needs to
know "why it is convicting or acquitting." Id.
122. See id. at 102. The court cited United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 740
(3d Cir. 1979), United States v. Bruton, 647 F.2d 818, 825 (8th Cir. 1981), United
States v. Blackburn, 592 F.2d 300, 301 (6th Cir. 1979), and United States u.
Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir. 1977), in support of the proposition in other
circuits that the prosecution may refuse a defendant's stipulation. See Gilliam, 994
F.2d at 102.
123. See Gilliam, 994 F.2d at 103. Relying in part upon United States v. Pirovolos,
844 F.2d 415, 420 (7th Cir. 1988), and United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 754 (2d
Cir. 1979), the court stated that the underlying facts of a prior conviction are "com-
pletely irrelevant" to a felon-in-possession charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(gXl). Gilliam,
994 F.2d at 103.
124. The Gilliam court appeared to be addressing whether a defendant could
stipulate the existence of a prior felony conviction in order to prevent the jury from
considering it. See supra note 51. The greater problem is analyzing the dicta that
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In United States v. Jones," the D.C. Circuit ruled that evi-
dence of the nature of a prior conviction violated Rule 403 once
a defendant offered a stipulation." In Jones, the nature of
the prior conviction, which involved illegal possession of a fire-
arm, was presented to the jury on five occasions, which the
government conceded was in error, but harmless.' 7 The court
of appeals disagreed and reversed the conviction. The rationale
was that a prior conviction element is based on "status." '
Status does not require a full showing of the offense's factual
details to meet the prosecution's burden of proof on the ele-
ment. Further, under Rule 403, the facts themselves are preju-
dicial and inadmissible if not tending to prove an element other
than status.2
states that the factual underpinnings of the conviction are irrelevant and non-proba-
tive, since this appears to argue that the jury is entitled only to knowledge of the
existence of a prior conviction, not the nature of that conviction. See Giliam, 994
F.2d at 103.
125. 67 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In Jones, the defendant, charged with being a
felon-in-possession, argued that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the
prosecution to present the name and nature of his past conviction when he offered to
stipulate to the prior conviction. See id. at 322.
126. See id. at 324.
127. See id. at 322. The government contended that the admission was harmless
because the prosecution did not overemphasize the prior conviction, the court issued
limiting instructions concerning the evidence, the defense failed to move for a sever-
ance, and overwhelming evidence of guilt on other grounds robbed the conviction evi-
dence of any overwhelming prejudicial effect. See id.
128. See id. at 323. Status is a "discrete and independent component .... a re-
quirement reflecting Congressional policy [under § 922(gXl)] that possession of a
firearm is categorically prohibited" for felons classified under the statute, such that
the "predicate crime is significant only to demonstrate status, and a full picture of
that offense is . . . beside the point." I& (quoting United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 1994)).
The court in Jones followed the First Circuit decision in Tavares, which distin-
guished cases in which defendants offered to stipulate to prior conviction evidence
relevant on grounds other than merely proving prior conviction from those cases in
which prior conviction stipulations were made where the evidence tended only to
prove conviction status. See id. at 323 (citing United States v. Blackburn, 592 F.2d
300 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1970)).
129. See Jones, 67 F.3d at 324. "IThe government did not need to establish the
nature of Jones' prior felony to meet its burden of proof' under the prior conviction
element. Id. at 324. Since the underlying facts were not necessary for the burden of
proof and only tended to increase the risk of unfair prejudice, there was an error in
allowing evidence tending to show the nature of the offense. See id.
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In United States v. Tavares,' the First Circuit distin-
guished Brickey"3' and held that a stipulation is a less preju-
dicial alternative for demonstrating the prior conviction ele-
ment."3 2 Daniel Tavares, who had a prior conviction for larce-
ny of a firearm, was arrested after a series of incidents which
ended with the defendant firing a weapon into a residence.
During the trial, the prosecution refused Tavares' offer to stipu-
late the prior conviction and proceeded to present evidence of
the nature of the conviction to prove his status as a convicted
felon."s The court held that evidence of the nature of the past
conviction was inadmissible unless the trial court could find
another compelling reason for admission under Rule 403.''
The court distinguished its prior holdings in United States v.
Collamore and United States v. Donlon by stating that those
130. 21 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1994). Charged with being a felon-in-possession, Tavares
attempted to stipulate to the prior felony conviction element, which the prosecution
refused to accept and proceeded to prove the conviction element by revealing the
name and nature of the past offense. See id. at 2.
131. See id. at 3. The majority pointed out that Brickey, which provided precedent
for the government to prove its own case in the event of stipulation, involved stipula-
tion to an element tending to require a factual narrative (proof of fraudulent intent)
that could not be shown by a concrete record of events, as a prior conviction trial
transcript can. See id. (citing Brickey, 426 F.2d at 680). The court distinguished
Tavares by stating that Brickey's stipulation "coicerned facts directly relevant to the
instant crime, [while Tavares] involves a stipulation to facts establishing only the
defendant's status." Id.
132. See ia. at 4. The court in Tavares noted that the prior conviction element is
a status element, such that the predicate crime is only necessary to show member-
ship in the class of felons, not to show character or reveal the nature of the prior
convictions. See id. The court stated that a "redacted record, testimony by a clerk,
stipulation, a defendant's affidavit, or even ... judicial notice of the prior conviction"
are all substitutes for admission of the full record, which, unlike the other alterna-
tives, contain a risk of unfair prejudice by revealing the name and nature of the
offense to the jury, which may lead to improper considerations. See id.; see generally
Katherine Conboy, Probative or Prejudicial? Defendant Charged as Felon-in-possession
of a Firearm May Stipulate to Status as a Felon, 29 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 941 (1995)
(discussing the history of stipulations in the First Circuit and Tavares' impact on
altering the ability of the government to refuse stipulations). But see supra notes 106-
07 and 112 (suggesting that stipulations are not to be considered as less prejudicial
alternatives for Rule 403 balancing).
133. See Tavares, 21 F.3d at 2.
134. See id. at 5. Additionally, the court claimed that the prior conviction element
is intended to be a neutral element, such that the nature of the predicate felony is
wholly unrelated to the crime. See id. at 4. The prosecution contended that the con-
viction evidence indeed was presented to prove more than status and went to dem-
onstrate the culpability of Tavares as a serious offender, though the court rejected
this proposal. See id.
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decisions required admission of evidence for purposes other
than merely establishing prior felon status." While admitting
that prior conviction evidence may be admitted over stipulation
when the evidence proves more in issue than prior felon status,
the court held that stipulations to felon status generally will
prevent the prosecution from introducing the nature of the un-
derlying offense. 3 '
After Tavares, the federal circuits were split in their treat-
ment of defendant stipulations to prior conviction evidence.
While the majority of circuits had ruled or suggested that a
stipulation would bar the prosecution from presenting evidence
concerning the nature of the predicate offense, three circuits
held that the government had no obligation to accept stipula-
tions."7 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit addressed stipula-
tions on a case-by-case basis and the Third Circuit had found
no need for resolution." With the courts in confusion over
how to treat stipulations, Old Chief arrived.
135. The reexamination of Collamore also led the Tavares court into a discussion
of the authority which Collamore rested upon, including: United States v. Blackburn,
592 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1979), United States v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1976),
United States v. Bruton, 647 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1981), and Brickey, 426 F.2d at 680.
See Tavares, 21 F.3d at 3.
136. See Tavares, 21 F.3d at 6. The court was clear in its message that stipula-
tions as to prior conviction status were different from other types of evidence and
receive paramount consideration in Rule 403 balancing.
In the first place, a stipulation to a defendant's status as a felon is easi-
ly and obviously distinguishable from those relating to his actions or
state of mind in committing the crime. In the second place, the evidence
we exclude has no legitimate claim to relevance. In the third place, the
unnecessary risk of unfair prejudice looms as clear and likely in this
context. Finally, our holding allows the trial court to recognize and artic-
ulate any special circumstances justifying admission of evidence of the
nature of the predicate offense.
Id.
137. The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits comprised
the majority of federal circuits that recognized that the defendants' stipulations im-
pose prosecutorial obligations, while the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits continued
to permit the government to refuse stipulations. See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v.
United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939,
939-40 n.3 (1997); see also Tavares, 21 F.3d at 5 (discussing the circuit split on stipu-
lations).
138. See Richman, supra note 137, at 939-40 n.3.
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Before 1993, Johnny Lynn Old Chief was convicted of a felo-
ny assault. In 1993, after a disturbance involving at least one
gunshot, Old Chief was arrested and charged with assault with
a deadly weapon, using a firearm in relation to a crime of vio-
lence, and being a felon-in-possession.' ° In a pre-trial motion
before a district court in the Ninth Circuit, Old Chief moved for
an order prohibiting the prosecution from mentioning or offer-
ing into evidence anything regarding the prior assault convic-
tion except Old Chiefs admission, under stipulation, that he
had been convicted of a prior felony within 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1)'s elements.' Old Chief argued that presentation of
the name and nature of the past offense would tax his ability
to receive a fair jury trial and that his subsequent stipulation
would render such evidence inadmissible under Rule 403.142
The prosecution refused to accept his stipulation and the dis-
trict court judge permitted the government to present the name
and nature of the past offense at trial.' After Old Chiefs
conviction, the Ninth Circuit refused to reverse the trial court's
decision and relied upon United States v. Breitkreutz in holding
that the admission of the evidence was an extension of the
prosecution's right to prove its own case.'
The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari based on the
circuit split over treatment of defendant stipulations 45 and
139. 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
140. See id. at 647.
141. See id. at 647-48. Further, Old Chief proposed a subsequently refused jury
instruction which would have attempted to explain that Old Chief fell within the
class of convicted felons while not betraying the nature of the prior assault convic-
tion. Since the Court dismissed Old Chiefs contention that the instruction was ade-
quate, this note will not address that portion of the case. See id.
142. See id. at 648.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 649 (holding that the evidence of the nature of the prior conviction
was probative). Under Breitkreutz, the court held that the Ninth Circuit did not rec-
ognize a stipulation as proof or a factor in Rule 403 balancing. See id.; see also supra
note 107.
145. The court noted the sharp division in treatment among the Sixth, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits' refusing to hold prosecutors to stipulations and the First, Fourth,
Tenth and D.C. Circuits which had limited government evidence based on stipula-
tions. Among the cases that the Supreme Court cited in its comparison of circuits
were United States v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1976), United States v. Smith,
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reversed the conviction." First, the Court held that the name
and nature of the offense were relevant to proving prior felon
status and that such relevancy was not diminished by alterna-
tive proofs such as stipulations.'47
Next, the majority held that a trial court abuses its Rule 403
discretion if it spurns a prior conviction stipulation under sec-
tion 922(g)(1) and admits the full record of the past conviction
over the defendant's objection." This conclusion was based on
several steps. First, the name and nature of the offense in-
crease the risk of improper consideration by the jury and
should not be admitted when their only purpose is to prove the
element of prior offense.'49 Next, the Court considered two
analytical methods for Rule 403 application: the island"s° and
the holistic 5' approaches. The Court rejected the island view
520 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1975), United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1994), and
United States v. Poore, 594 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1979). See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 649.
146. See id.
147. See id. But see supra notes 123 and 136 (finding that prior conviction records
presenting the underlying details were irrelevant).
Having conceded relevancy, the Court then held that any exclusion of prior
conviction evidence must arise during Rule 403 balancing, such that the issue be-
comes one of probative value rather than relevancy under Rules 401 and 402. See
Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650.
148. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650-51.
149. See id. (citing the inherent bias considerations in Rule 404(bYs limitation on
the use of past bad acts evidence to prove character alone).
150. "An item of evidence might be viewed as an island, with estimates of its own
probative value and unfairly prejudicial risk the sole reference points in deciding
whether the danger substantially outweighs the value and whether the evidence
ought to be excluded." Id. at 651.
151. [T]he question of admissibility might be seen as inviting further
comparisons to take account of the full evidentiary context of the
case.... This second approach would start out like the [island ap-
proach] but be ready to go further. On objection, the court would decide
whether a particular item of evidence raised a danger of unfair prejudice.
If it did, the judge would go on to evaluate the degrees of probative
value and unfair prejudice not only for the item in question but for any
actually available substitutes as well. If an alternative were found to
have substantially the same or greater probative value but a lower dan-
ger of unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion would discount the value
of the first item offered and exclude it if its discounted probative value
were substantially outweighed by unfairly prejudicial risk.
Id. (considering the analysis of United States v. O'Shea, 724 F.2d 1514, 1517 (11th
Cir. 1984), in which the appellate court adopted the lower courts perspective in ana-
lyzing admissibility of evidence). Additionally, the considerations would be conducted
in light of evidentiary need for detail and smooth narration. See id. The Court did
limit its holding to felon-in-possession cases. See id. at 650 n.7.
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as a method that would allow parties to structure evidentiary
requests to maximize prejudicial effect and instead adopted the
holistic approach.'52 Relying on the determination that, in
general, evidence of prior bad acts evidence is highly prejudi-
cial, the court examined the felon-in-possession prior conviction
element and found that Old Chiefs stipulation was alternative
proof, under the Rule 403 balancing test, that should have been
considered when assessing the admissibility of the prosecution's
evidence."e Since both alternatives were relevant, the differ-
ence needed to be assessed in probative weight.
While the Court recognized the general power of the
prosecution to prove its own case,M the Court held that a sto-
ry is not needed to prove an abstract "status" element such as
prior conviction, especially where the details of a conviction
story are remotely relevant to the issues in question.'55 Thus,
a holistic approach to Rule 403 concerning prior convictions
should bar evidence of the name and nature of the offense since
less prejudicial alternatives exist which reduce the probative
value of the prior convictions.
A synopsis of the majority's holding runs as follows. While
the nature of the prior conviction is relevant to lay the founda-
tion of proof for the prior conviction element,'56 it also carries
a risk of undue prejudice. 7 Since either a stipulation or ad-
152. See id. at 651-52. In choosing the holistic approach, the court delineated Rule
401 "relevance? from Rule 403 "probativeness" by stating that the latter was deter-
mined by comparing evidentiary alternatives. See id. (citing FED. I. EVID. 403 advi-
sory committee's note).
153. See id. at 652-53.
154. See id. at 653 (citing Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1958)).
While the court agreed that the general rule protects the prosecution's need to tell a
story and inform the jury, the court refused to recognize the validity of the rule
when the prosecution did not need to tell a story to meet its burden and its story
would only introduce prejudice. See id. at 655.
155. See id. (citing United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994)).
156. Showing the nature of the prior conviction "was a step on one evidentiary
route to the ultimate fact [of predicate felon status], since it served to place Old
Chief within a particular sub-class of offenders" and the "documentary record of the
conviction for that named offense was thus relevant evidence in making... status
more probable." Id. at 649.
157. See id. at 651. Note that the majority cites Michelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469, 475 (1948), in defining the effect of unfair prejudice; yet, Michelson held
that prior conviction evidence was admissible if it went towards proof of an element,
a seemingly disparate treatment of unfairly prejudicial material than what is found
1998]
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mission of the full record" can satisfy the status element of
prior conviction, the only difference in the two is their degree of
prejudice.'59 Though usually given its choice of argument, the
prosecution's evidence is always subject to Rule 403 balanc-
ing."w Where the difference in evidence is merely in its preju-
dicial effect, as here, then Rule 403 requires the court to ex-
clude the full record for the less risky alternative, the
defendant's stipulation."6 ' The court abuses its discretion if it
fails to exclude the full record when it is unnecessary, does not
damage the prosecution's burden of proof on the status element,
and will lead to improper jury considerations."8
In response, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, argued that the
majority misapplied Rule 403 and upset precedent." First,
Rule 403 acts to exclude unfairly prejudicial evidence, which
does not include evidence tending to prove an element.' The
in Old Chief Compare Michelson, 335 U.S. at 483 (allowing the prosecution to intro-
duce evidence of the nature of arrest, not conviction, records) with Old Chief, 117 S.
Ct. at 650 (generalizing that the nature of prior convictions will almost always be
grounds for improper considerations).
158. See United States v. Pirovolos, 844 F.2d 415, 420 (7th Cir. 1988).
159. "[Tlhere is no cognizable difference between the evidentiary significance of an
admission and of the legitimately probative component of the official record . . [Tihe
functions of the competing evidence are distinguishable only by the risk [of unfair
prejudice] inherent in the one [record] and wholly absent from the other. Old Chief,
117 S. Ct. at 655.
160. See id. at 653-54.
161. The prosecution needs no "evidentiary depth" to prove the status element and
the full record has 'no application when the point at issue is a defendants legal sta-
tus ... rendered . . . independently of the concrete events of later criminal behav-
ior." Id. at 654-55. A stipulation is an "alternative, relevant, admissible ... [and]
seemingly conclusive" piece of evidence tending to prove status without the prejudice
of the full record. Id. at 653. From this, the question of admissibility under Rule 403
"might be seen as inviting further comparisons to take account of the full evidentiary
context of the case ... to evaluate the degrees of probative value and unfair preju-
dice not only for the item in question but for any actually available substitutes as
well." Id. at 651. Once the "calculations" were finished, a judge "applying Rule 403
could reasonably apply some discount to the probative value of an item of evidence
when faced with less risky alternative[s]." Id,
162. See id. at 647.
163. See id. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164. See id.; see also United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690 (9th Cir. 1993)
(stating that where a prior conviction is an element of the offense, a stipulation has
no place in Rule 403 balancing). But see United State v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 29-
30 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that although Rule 404(b) would not keep out evidence
that proved an element, Rule 403 may act to rule out cumulative and highly prejudi-
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minority noted that virtually all government evidence will be
prejudicial to the defendant in that it aims to incriminate him
or her; therefore, the question under Rule 403 is whether the
evidence is unfairly prejudicial. The minority found that since
prior conviction status was an element and Congress intended
juries to learn of the name and nature of the offense, the evi-
dence pertaining to the proof of such element could not be un-
fairly prejudicial." Additionally, the minority disagreed with
the majority's contention that the prosecution's argument was
not damaged by the defendant's stipulation1" and argued that
the majority failed to explain exactly why admission of the
record was unfair prejudice. 67 Second, the minority argued
that the decision upset the generally recognized rule allowing a
party to prove its case.1"8 Further, giving a stipulation conclu-
sive power is analogous to permitting partial guilty verdicts
without the consent of the court,"c contradicting the power of
the court to refuse similar strategies.'
cial evidence).
165. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). While the ma-
jority considers all prior bad acts to be highly prejudicial and prior conviction status
to signify a "class membership" provable by abstract evidentiary items, the minority
focuses on the need for the prosecution to prove that status by demonstrating the
concrete actions that granted class membership. See ic
166. See id. at 659. The minority stated that "[blecause the Government bears the
burden of proof on every element of a charged offense, it must be accorded substan-
tial leeway to submit evidence of its choosing to prove its case." Id. at 659-60.
167. See id& at 657-58 (stating that the majority has failed to state exactly why
the revelation of the nature of a prior conviction will lead to improper consider-
ations). The majority opinion stated that prior conviction evidence would increase the
propensity for improper considerations, but did not cite to any general authority stat-
ing that past convictions were always unfairly prejudicial. See id, at 651.
168. See i& at 659.
169. "[mn 'conceding' ... [a] prior felony conviction, a defendant may be trying to
take the issue from the jury altogether by effectively entering a partial plea of guilty,
something we have never before endorsed .... A defendant who concedes ... may
be ... trying to waive his right to a jury trial on that element. Id. at 660.
170. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965) (holding that the only
constitutional right to trial is one by jury and a waiver of this right may be condi-
tioned on acceptance by both the court and the prosecution).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF OLD CHIEF: APPLICATION OF RULE 403 AND
EVIDENCE EXCLUSION
Turning to the reasoning of the case, the principal argument
in Old Chief pertains to Rule 403's application to evidence of
the prior conviction element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).' 7' Both
the majority and minority agreed that evidence showing the
nature of prior convictions is relevant because the facts proving
Old Chiefs prior assault was one step in showing that he was
a member of the class of prior felons. 72 The issue, however, is
not relevance, but probative value.' The majority argued
that the evidence's probative value is not sufficient to overcome
,its unfair prejudicial value under Rule 403.174 The Court rec-
ognized that evidence of prior acts generally is inadmissible
under Rule 404 because of prejudicial effects on jury consider-
ations; however, in felon-in-possession cases, prior convictions
171. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650 (stating that "[tihe principle issue is the
scope of a trial judge's discretion under Rule 403 .... ").
172. See id. at 649 (stating also that relevance was unaffected by the availability
of alternative proofs). While the majority recognized that the nature of the assault is
not relevant in showing that the conviction was for a particular type of crime, such
as theft rather than assault, the nature of the past offense was relevant to place Old
Chief in the necessary category of prior felons. Therefore, the complete record would
show that felon status was more probable than not-the threshold test of relevance
under Rule 401. Additionally, the minority asserted that the name and nature of the
offense are inseparable from the existence of an earlier conviction, which insinuates
that no proof of a prior conviction adequately could exclude the name and nature
without removing adequate proof of the past offense. See id. at 657 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting).
173. See supra note 152.
174. Revealing the nature of prior convictions causes unfair prejudice by introduc-
ing the risk of improper grounds for consideration. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650.
Additionally, the specific name and nature of the offense is beyond what is necessary
to prove the prior conviction element. See id. at 653. If the evidence is not necessary,
then its probative value is likely to be minimal. See United States v. Spletzer, 535
F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that "an important consideration relating to
probative value is the prosecutorial need for such evidence); WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 22 (stating that the extent to which the prosecution needs the evidence is
a principal issue in determining probative value). Thus, the name and nature will
have little probative value, because it is unnecessary, while having high unfair preju-
dicial value, making it a prime target for exclusion under Rule 403. While the major-
ity appears to say that the probative value is also decreased by the presence of oth-
er, less prejudicial alternative proofs, this alone seems less important in excluding the
prior conviction evidence than its unnecessary nature. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at
652.
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are allowed as an exception, under Rule 404(b), because they
constitute an element of the offense. 75 Once Rule 404(b) ap-
plies, then the court must balance probative value against prej-
udice using Rule 403."76
In its Rule 403 balancing, the majority opinion introduced a
less restrictive alternatives test.' This test is a formulation
of the holistic approach to Rule 403 in which the probative
value of an evidentiary item is assessed by comparing it with
other alternatives. 78 The Court adopted Jones' view that
membership in § 922(g)(1)'s prior conviction class is a status
element.'79 Thus, the underlying facts are unimportant so long
as there is some evidence tending to show that the defendant is
indeed a member of the statute's broad class of convicted felons.
This makes a stipulation of class membership equivalent to
presenting the entire record because the underlying facts are
unnecessary to prove membership; either will be sufficient.se
The only difference is that the full record carries a risk of un-
fair prejudice that a stipulation does not;"8' yet, the risk is
entirely contained in the facts of the prior conviction, which
facts are not necessary to prove status.' 2 From this, both a
175. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 653-54.
176. See United States v. Garcia,'983 F.2d 1160, 1172 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that
once Rule 404(b) exemption occurs, the next step is to apply Rule 403); WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 22 (stating that once evidence passes Rule 404(b), then the court
still must assess the evidence under Rule 403 and that this decision is not discretion-
ary); see also supra note 35.
177. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 652; see also supra notes 150-51 (discussing the
majority formulations for application of Rule 403).
178. See supra note 151. This adoption also relies on the majority's consensus that
the distinguishing factor between relevance and probativeness lies in the latter's con-
sideration of alternative proofs rather than whether the item merely makes a factual
proposition more or less probable. See supra note 152.
179. While the court does not cite Jones v. United States, 67 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir.
1995), the majority does say that status is "wholly independent of the concrete events
of later criminal behavior . .. . Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 654. This is analogous to
the language in Jones which states that prior conviction status is "discrete and inde-
pendent." Jones, 67 F.3d at 323 (citing United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 1994)).
180. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655 (stating that the evidentiary significance of a
stipulation is equivalent to the evidentiary significance of the full record in proving
prior conviction status).
181. See id.
182. The only difference between using a stipulation and using the record to show
status is that the latter carries the risk of unfair prejudice. See id. The prejudice
comes from the name and nature of the offense. See id at 650. Proof of status, how-
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stipulation and the full record have equal probative value. Yet,
when the holistic Rule 403 is applied, the full record becomes
unfairly prejudicial as alternative proof of equal value, but with
less prejudicial value, exists to lower the full conviction's proba-
tive weight."8 Under Rule 403 balancing, the risk of prejudice
will make the full record less appropriate than a proffered
stipulation because the record's probative value is diminished
by its unnecessary prejudicial content."' The court must then
chose the less prejudicial alternative, the stipulation or analo-
gous evidence,"8 to satisfy Rule 403 without an abuse of dis-
cretion.
The problem is that Rule 403 does not necessarily require a
less prejudicial alternatives test."' Rule 403 requires exclu-
ever, does not require a showing of the name and nature of the prior offense. See id.
at 653. Thus, deductively, the risk must come from what is extraneous and irrelevant
to the proof.
183. Both a stipulation and full record go toward proving a prior conviction exists,
but the latter also supports improper considerations concerning Old Chief's propensity
to be a violent felon. Application of the holistic approach to Rule 403 requires a com-
parison of both methods of proof. Proof by the full record already contains both pro-
bative value and a degree of prejudicial value, but, on comparison with the stipula-
tion alternative, the prejudicial value increases since an alternative exists that does
not contain the same prejudice. Additionally, because the prosecution does not need
the evidence to prove the conviction, the prejudicial effect is high in comparison to
the probative aspect. All of these factors demonstrates that the prejudicial value sub-
stantially outweighs the probative value. See id.
184. See id. at 655 (stating that risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh
the discounted probative value of the record); Jones, 67 F.3d at 324 (holding that the
nature of the prior conviction was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, such that an
abuse of discretion occurred to allow the evidence under Rule 403 when other evi-
dence was available); Tavares, 21 F.3d at 4 (holding that additional facts of prior con-
viction are irrelevant and not sufficiently probative under Rule 403 to prove prior
conviction status alone when the evidence is overwhelmingly prejudicial); United
States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that additional facts of
prior conviction are irrelevant and prejudicial).
185. The majority contended that a record redacted of the name and nature of the
prior conviction offers the same proof as a stipulation or full record in proving prior
conviction status. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656. The full record would be categori-
cally excluded only when a felon-in-possession prior conviction element requires proof,
because in such a situation the evidence will always have minimal probative value
and high prejudicial value. See supra notes 182 and 184. Additionally, the facts will
not go towards proof of another element if no other charges are present, so there will
not be grounds for admission of the prior conviction's facts on another basis. See Old
Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655.
186. See United States v. O'Shea, 724 F.2d 1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating
that a court is not required to choose the least prejudicial alternative available for
proof). But see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 22 ("[P]robative worth [under Rule
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sion of evidence if its probative value is less than its prejudicial
value, not exclusion because there are less restrictive alterna-
tives. While the advisory committee's note to Rule 403 states
that "the availability of other means of proof may also be an
appropriate factor,""'7 the passage of the Rule does not man-
date a holistic approach. Thus, even though evidence may have
a greater risk of unfair prejudice than an alternative, if the
evidence is more probative than prejudicial, then the court
should be able to admit that evidence over less prejudicial al-
ternatives.1ce The majority recognized this and crafted its ar-
gument to fit the rule as it stands. While the opinion seemed to
argue that evidence of the nature of prior convictions is exclud-
ed categorically in the presence of alternatives, 9 the basis for
the argument would appear to contain two premises. First,
evidence of the nature of prior convictions, is generally, unfairly
prejudicial."9 Second, if evidence is extraneous to proof of the
element, then it has a low probative value. 9' From these
premises, the majority reached its conclusion that the nature of
prior convictions under felon-in-possession cases is almost al-
ways excluded.
The first portion of the argument lies in the assertion that
prior conviction evidence relating the name and nature are,
generally, unfairly prejudicial. The majority stated that such
evidence increases the risk of improper considerations and rais-
es the specter of prejudice."9 While correct in that analysis,
403] . .. is . . . affected by the scarcity or abundance of other [alternative] evidence
on the same point.").
187. See FED. R. EVED. 403 advisory committee's note.
188. Rule 403 is not a mechanical rule, but a rule of discretion. WRIGHT & GRA-
HAM, supra note 22. As such, the question is not whether the evidence is less preju-
dicial than other evidence, but whether the evidence's probative value is still greater
than any prejudicial value it may have. See z&
189. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 652.
190. See id. ('[Evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally car-
ries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.").
191. This is a synthesis of two minor premises. First, the specific name and nature
are beyond what is necessary to prove status. See id. at 653. Second, both a stipula-
tion and the full record carry equal evidentiary or probative weight in showing sta-
tus. See id& at 655. If the full record has no more probative weight than a stripped
down stipulation, then one must conclude that the specific facts add little or no pro-
bative value to the record and are truly extraneous.
192. The Coures determination relies upon the inherent limitations of such evi-
dence in Rule 404's limiting provisions for conviction evidence. See id. at 651.
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the majority cannot then say that such evidence is always un-
fairly prejudicial, because that premise is distinct from improp-
er considerations. As the minority asserted that all evidence
against the defendant will be "prejudicial" in that it will go to
prove guilt,9 ' the majority required a mechanism to jump
from the possibility of improper considerations to unfair preju-
dice. Thus, the second prong of the test, application of Rule
403's evidentiary alternatives test, is needed to demonstrate
why prior conviction records generally will not be merely preju-
dicial, but unfairly prejudicial.
The brunt of the issue lies in a synthesis of the premises and
the need to prove a prior conviction element. To prove felon-in-
possession, the prosecution must show prior conviction as an
element." Yet, if it introduces the full record, it will intro-
duce a risk of unfair prejudice by submission of the factual
underpinnings of the conviction, material that is extraneous to
merely proving status as a felon. In isolation, Rule 404(b)
would allow the evidence to prove the element,'95 while Rule
403 would show that the probative value was less than its
prejudicial effect.' Yet, Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 should
work together,197 not in isolation, so that it would lead to a
193. Note that while the majority believes that presentation of the name and na-
ture of the offense will increase the risk of prejudice against the defendant, the mi-
nority assumes an opposite position. The minority finds that exclusion of the evidence
actually results in greater detriment to the defendant because it requires the jury to
consider prior conviction evidence without the full narrative and leads them to specu-
late about the underlying offense when ruling on guilt. See id. at 658 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Under the minority view, presentation of the evidence may be prejudicial
in that it proves guilt, but is not fodder for improper consideration since it provides
a flowing narrative that prevents the very juror speculation concerning prior convic-
tions that is the strongest basis for improper considerations. See id.
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(gX) (1994).
195. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (stating that evidence of prior acts or crimes, includ-
ing convictions for past offenses, is admissible where the evidence goes towards proof
of an element of the offense).
196. See FED. R. EVED. 404 (stating that evidence whose unfair prejudice substan-
tilly outweighs its probative value is generally inadmissible, even if tending to prove
an essential element). As shown above, where only the prior conviction status needs
proof, the risk of unfair prejudice will, generally, outweigh any probative value. See
supra notes 190-91.
197. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 22 (stating that Rule 404(b) provides a
mechanism to allow proof into proceedings that is otherwise generally inadmissible,
and that Rule 403 acts to reduce the prejudicial impact that may arise from abuse of
Rule 404(b)'s window of opportunity); see also United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160,
1172 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that Rules 404(b) and 403 are each part of a dual test
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seemingly incongruous result to exempt generally prejudicial
evidence under Rule 404(b), only to find it overwhelmingly
prejudicial under Rule 403.'
The solution appears to lie in the majority's finding of a
subset of alternative evidentiary methods that satisfy both Rule
404(b) and Rule 403.' In addition, the majority reasons that
evidence of the nature of prior convictions, while satisfying Rule
404(b), fails Rule 403 and, therefore, must be excluded."°° No
mechanical alternatives test really exists,2"' but only a cat-
egorical test of whether something meets the rules or not."es
The nature of prior convictions is not excluded because there
are less restrictive alternatives, but because it alone fails to
for the admission of generally prejudicial evidence, and that Rule 403 will work to
exclude highly prejudicial information even if it is found relevant under Rule 404).
198. Rule 403 is a check on evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) to insure that
the probative value of evidence introduced is not overwhelmed by unfair prejudicial
value. See Garcia, 983 F.2d at 1172. If this is so, then Rule 403 appears to restrain
Rule 404(b); yet, if Rule 403 allows extremely prejudicial material to enter via Rule
404, then it serves virtually no purpose as applied to Rule 404(b).
199. The alternatives that show prior conviction status (including stipulations,
redacted records, and similar methods, such as sworn affidavits) are allowed under
Rule 404(b). They also pass Rule 403 because their probative value (proof of status)
outweighs the prejudicial value associated with the jury's knowledge of a prior convic-
tion. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655-56.
200. While a full record, relevant in showing status, generally is admissible under
Rule 404(b), Rule 403 should find that the unfair prejudicial value outweighs the
probative value of the name and nature of the prior conviction. See id.; see also supra
notes 190-91.
201. The alternatives test that provides categorical exclusion of prior conviction
status is flawed for two reasons. First, the majority asserts a mechanical analysis of
Rule 403 that should always prevent presentation of the full conviction record as
unfairly prejudicial. Yet, this test requires an analysis of the evidence presented and
the stipulation, which may vary in the context, such that some type of discretionary
ruling will be required. Second, the rule applies narrowly to felon-in-possession cases,
and prior conviction evidence may be introduced in support of other factual propo-
sitions. When the prosecution asserts these bases for admission, the court will have
to conduct a Rule 403 test without the proposed "mechanical" application and the
admission will again depend on judicial scrutiny.
202. Alternative evidentiary standards may have an effect on the probative value
of other, more prejudicial standards. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 652; WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 22 (asserting that probative value will be affected by alternative
evidence tending to prove the same thing). The alternatives, however, do not neces-
sarily exclude the full record of the name and nature merely because they are less
prejudicial, but do have some effect on the records probative value. The test under
Rule 403 is whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial. Since the full record is over-
whelmingly prejudicial without adding anything to the probative value, it fails under
Rule 403. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655.
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meet Rule 403 when there is only a question of status. The
existence of other methods of proof that do satisfy Rule 403
shows merely that the prosecution can meet its burden of proof
without risk of improper considerations.
The majority categorically excludes evidence of the nature of
prior convictions when its purpose is to prove solely the status
element, because the evidence is not necessary to prove the
element.ce If it is not necessary, then its probative value is
minimal; 4 in contrast, its prejudicial value will be high.'
Thus, under Rule 403, even though the nature is relevant, the
facts must be excluded because the risk of unfair prejudice
outweighs probative value. The simple fact that the evidence
would tend to prove the element under Rule 404(b) does not
give the prosecution unlimited reign to use any and all evidence
to prove that element.2
Turning to the dissent, the argument that the majority mis-
applies Rule 403 is flawed. O'Connor argues that once evidence
meets Rule 404(b), it cannot be unfairly prejudicial since it goes
toward proof of that element. 7 Yet, lower courts have conced-
ed that evidence that meets Rule 404(b) can still be excluded
under Rule 403, as in the case of presenting multiple prior
convictions to prove a prior conviction element.' Allowing a
Rule 404(b) exemption to pass automatically Rule 403 would
not be a proper conclusion.
While the minority would appear to respond that Rule 403
allows the evidence because it is not unfairly prejudicial, they
fail to make a delineation as to what qualifies as unfair preju-
dice, just as the majority failed to do so.' Just as the majori-
203. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655.
204. See supra note 191.
205. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 652.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that while evidence of multiple convictions is relevant under Rule 404(b) to show
felon status, Rule 403 generally renders multiple conviction evidence inadmissible due
to the evidence's lack of probative value and cumulative unfair prejudice).
207. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 657 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
208. See Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 692; United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 2930
(1st Cir. 1989) ("Although Rule 404(b) would not keep out evidence designed to show
an element ... Rule 403 would keep out evidence of several prior convictions, where
most evidence is cumulative and highly prejudicial.).
209. "The court never explains precisely why it constitutes 'unfair' prejudice . .. to
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ty cannot provide a consistent argument that prior conviction
evidence always is excluded because it is unfairly prejudicial,
the minority cannot prove that the same evidence is never
unfairly prejudicial.
Further, the dissent argued that a stipulation cannot relieve
the government of its burden of proof'10 and that a stipulation
itself raises serious questions about the ability of the defendant
to direct the prosecution's method of proof and constitutional
questions regarding the jury's role. 11 This argument is not
entirely complete, because it fails to recognize that a stipulation
does not require an obligation of acceptance or force the gov-
ernment to abandon evidence regarding the nature of the prior
offense. 2' A stipulation is only one of several methods by
which the prosecution can prove felon status and it can choose
from among these methods rather than accept a stipulation. 1'
If the majority is correct that the prior conviction's nature will
be excluded in most instances, then the government will have
its choice among a variety of methods, all tending to the same
proof, and always will be restricted from giving the facts under
Rule 403, whether there is a stipulation or not.2' 4 A stipula-
directly prove an essential element." Old Chief, 117, S. Ct. at 657 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Yet, the dissent does not respond to the overwhelmingly general consensus
that the name and nature of a prior offense is highly prejudicial. See i&. at 652.
While the dissent argues that the evidence goes to proof of an element under Rule
404(b), the analysis, as shown above, does not stop there since the court must also
examine the evidence under Rule 403. See United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160,
1172 (1st Cir. 1993). There is no indication that the dissent examines any Rule 403
balancing except to say that the evidence is not unfairly prejudicial.
210. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
211. See supra note 169.
212. The government may choose to pursue its own proof through a redacted re-
cord or affidavit. See supra note 199.
213. "The Government might, indeed, propose such [alternatives] for the trial court
to weigh against a defendant's offer to admit, as indeed the government might do
even if the defendant's admission had been received into evidence." Old Chief, 117 S.
Ct. at 655 n.10.
214. 'There may be yet other means of proof besides a formal admission on the
record that, with a proper objection, will obligate a district court to exclude evidence
of the name of the offense." Id. Additionally, "the general rule when proof of convict
status is at issue" is to rule the facts of the predicate conviction inadmissible. Id. at
655-656.
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tion would merely offer another method of proof, but would not
constrict proof or choice.215 Even if stipulations were contrary
to constitutional requirements, the government could still be re-
strained from presenting the factual background of prior convic-
tions under Rule 403.216 Stipulations are not catalysts in
triggering Rule 403 exclusion. Unfair prejudice is what leads to
the inadmissibility of the nature of past acts.217
V. CONCLUSION
Several key points should appear from an analysis of Old
Chief. First, the holding is limited to the prior conviction ele-
ment of section 922(g)(1).21 1 Second, the holding applies cat-
egorically only when a felon-in-possession charge is present, but
not necessarily when other charges are present.2 ' Third, both
the majority and the minority cannot agree on the nature of
"unfair prejudice"' ° and this appears to be the source of the
215. If proof of the nature of the prior conviction always was inadmissible, wheth-
er there was a stipulation or not, then the government would not lose any ground if
it could not introduce the evidence in any case.
216. If a stipulation is not integral in defeating prior conviction evidence under
Rule 403, but the evidence itself falls under the weight of its own unfair prejudice,
then the dissentfs concerns over stipulations are unfounded since the government will
be restrained in its proof regardless. See supra note 214.
217. See supra note 202 (Rule 403 test hinges on unfair prejudice, not alterna-
tives).
218. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651 n.7.
219. See id. at 651 (where the nature of the prior conviction will goes towards
proof of some other element, the Rule 403 will generally admit the evidence).
220. While neither the majority nor the minority opinions grasp the unfair preju-
dice issue with triumph, the two sides do appear to engage in fairness of method.
The majority argues that evidence of prior convictions generally raises the risk of
improper considerations, but that the government will win admission of the evidence
in most Rule 403 balancing tests. Thus, the majority is carving a narrow exception to
limit the government's ability to prejudice the defendant in the extreme situation
where the evidence is almost always irrelevant and only prejudicial. See id. Alterna-
tively, the dissent concentrates on the ability of the prosecution to meet its burden of
proof, but also on the ability of the defendant to receive a fair and constitutional
trial. See id. at 658-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the importance of the
jury being informed for purposes of consideration). Both sides disagree on what is fair
for the defendant and which general rule prejudices him less: a-categorical exclusion
or the general rule allowing the prosecution to present its own evidence and thus
inform the jury, thereby allowing it to produce a knowledgeable conviction or acquit-
tal. See id.; see also United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1993) (stat-
ing that the jury needs to be apprised of the facts to enter a proper verdict for a
felon-in-possession case).
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divergent opinions and what makes Old Chief a unique and
limited decision.
When a section 922(gXl) offense occurs among other offenses,
the prosecution may not be limited in presenting the facts of
the prior conviction if they meet Rule 403 balancing." In
these cases, the evidence could show more than status and
have greater probative weight, thereby outweighing the prejudi-
cial effects.
Additionally, in formulating a categorical rule of exclusion,
Old Chief emphasizes that Rule 403 is not mechanical, but
discretionary, and must be resolved on a case by case basis.'
While evidence of the nature of prior acts, generally, will be
inadmissible under Rule 403 due to the status element,'
there may be exceptions when the evidence would be admissible
for other purposes.' A determination of "unfair prejudice"
will depend on the quality of the case and an assessment of
both the probative value and the prejudice, the very source of
contention between Old Chiefs majority and minority opinions.
So long as the evidence tends to prove an element other than
felon status or fails to increase the risk of improper consider-
221. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651; United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 1994) ("[Elvidence beyond the fact of the prior conviction is inadmissible absent
adequate trial court findings that its noncumulative relevance is sufficiently compel-
ling to survive the balancing test of Rule 403.").
222. "[Elvidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk
of unfair prejudice .... That risk will vary from case to case . . . but will be sub-
stantial whenever the official record offered . . . would be arresting enough to lure a
juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning." Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 652. Dis-
cretion under Rule 403 will assess whether there is a risk of unfair prejudice and
also whether the record is arresting enough to lead to improper considerations. See
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 22 (stating that a court will assess both probative
value and prejudicial value in balancing the evidence under Rule 403).
223. See Old Chief, 117 S. CL at 652; United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 322
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that other crimes evidence is always prejudicial); United
States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d at 6 (saying that the "unnecessary risk of unfair prejudice
looms" in the context of prior conviction evidence).
224. See FED. IL EVID. 404(b) (evidence is admissible to show motive, intent, prep-
aration, knowledge, plan, identity, or mistake).
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ations, the evidence may be admissible.' Trial judges still
must conduct Rule 403 balancing as before, 6 even though the
Supreme Court has provided a rule that evidence of the nature
of prior convictions, generally, is inadmissible. At the most, the
decision has placed a judicial thumb on the Rule 403 scales
against evidence concerning the nature of prior convictions in
the limited context of a single statute. At minimum, the deci-
sion has stated a previously known tautology: where the evi-
dence violates Rule 403 by having greater unfair prejudicial
weight than probative value, then the evidence is inadmissible
under Rule 403.
Old Chiefs holding should not have a substantial effect on
the prosecution's right to carry its burden of proof. The
holding's limitations on the method of proof are consistent with
Rule 403.' Where the prosecution introduces evidence of the
nature of prior acts, the government can expect the trial court
to allow the admission unless there is a clear abuse of discre-
tion under Old Chief's Yet, the discretionary standard is
225. The holding of Old Chief requires that evidence be inadmissible when it both
increases the risk of improper considerations and the purpose of the evidence is solely
to prove the element of prior conviction. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647. This
should mean that only when the conjunction is met does the rule of Old Chief apply.
See United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 786 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Old Chief and
holding that while evidence of the .nature of a predicate offense failed to prove any
element but the prior felony conviction, admission was harmless because other con-
victing evidence rendered the risk of improper considerations minimal); Redding v.
United States, 105 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Old Chief and holding
that, while evidence of the nature of a prior conviction went solely to show the con-
viction element, no error occurred from an increased risk of unfair prejudice because
of other overwhelming evidence displaying guilt). But see United States v. Blake, 107
F.3d 651, 652 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Old Chief and finding an abuse of discretion
where evidence of the nature of a prior conviction went only to prove the conviction
element and the evidence raised the risk of improper considerations).
226. A judge has no discretion as to whether to perform a Rule 403 balancing test
and he maintains a duty to weigh the factors. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
22, § 5214, at 263. If the Old Chief test requires a trial judge to assess the evidence
and determine if there are any improper considerations, then nothing has changed
procedurally since judges have had to perform this test prior to Old Chief. See i&
227. The majority opinion has not altered Rule 403, but has shown that the na-
ture of prior felony convictions is generally inadmissible under the test where the
proof is offered only to show status, because it increases the risk of improper consid-
erations. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 647. If the use of prior conviction evidence is lost
under the original test, then nothing has been taken from the government that it
should have had prior to the ruling.
228. See id. at 651.
1998] OLD CHIEF V. UNITED STATES
vague enough that this probably will happen only where the
evidence alone can be shown to lead the jury to engage in an
improper sequence of bad character reasoning or where the
admission is not cognizably different from a stipulation except
for its prejudicial value.' In all other cases, if the evidence
tends either directly to prove anything other than felon status
or overwhelmingly shows guilt, such evidence will be admitted
as either satisfying Rule 404(b) and 403 or as constituting
harmless error.2 °
This result is supported by the case law subsequent to Old
Chief. In most instances, the circuits have ruled that over-
whelming evidence of guilt or support of other factual proposi-
tions rendered admission of the nature of prior convictions
harmless error."' This finding has been true even for cases in
which Old Chief was supposed to have the greatest influence
over-cases in which only a 922(g)(1) offense was presented. 2
The minority view has been to reverse the lower court's deci-
sion based on abuse of discretion in admitting the prior convic-
tion evidence. The cases have circumvented Old Chiefs holding
229. See supra note 225 (cases following Old Chief that have found harmless error
where both elements are not met).
230. See id.
231. See United States v. Taylor, 122 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
government could refuse stipulation to prior conviction evidence of involuntary man-
slaughter and that Old Chief did not require exclusion of evidence that would preju-
dice jury consideration of defendanfs self defense claim); LaForce v. United States,
976 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Va. 1997) (holding that the admission of the defendants two
murder convictions over the defendant's stipulation was collateral and harmless given
the defendant's own statements concerning the prior convictions which were needed to
provide evidentiary depth to the prosecution's story); see also supra note 225.
A growing use of the Old Chief holding in non-felon-in-possession cases has
been in support of the prosecution's right to prove its own case. See Gonzalez v.
DeTella, 127 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the right of the prosecution to
prove its own case stated in Old Chief rendered the government's introduction of
gruesome murder photographs harmless); United States v. Ortiz, 125 F.3d 630 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that the government was permitted, under Old Chief, to introduce
photos of the defendants using gang signals to show conspiracy rather than rely on
defendants' stipulation to their relation).
232. See United States v. Anaya, 117 F.3d 447 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding the court
did not substantially prejudice felon-in-possession defendant by refusing to accept his
stipulation and requiring the government to prove the conviction at trial for purposes
of enhanced sentence); United States v. Horsman, 114 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing that refusal to accept defendant's prior felony stipulation and the presentation at
trial of four prior convictions was not abuse of discretion under Old Chief where
evidence of overwhelming guilt rendered such introduction harmless).
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by finding, in most cases, that presentation of the evidence did
not affect the substantial rights of the parties, a finding pre-
mised on Rule 403 balancing of prejudice and probative value.
One question, yet unanswered, is whether Old Chiefs exclu-
sion of prior conviction evidence excludes symmetrically or
asymmetrically.' If the rule applies symmetrically, then nei-
ther the defense nor the prosecution may introduce the nature
of a prior conviction. When the prior conviction consists of an
old offense or a crime which would lead the jury to sympathize
with the accused, detriment, rather than prejudice, to the de-
fendant results since he would be barred from presenting evi-
dence in support of the case.' If the rule is asymmetrical,
then the defendant could introduce prior conviction evidence to
assist the defense, but the prosecution would remain barred
from introducing the nature of the past felony. This rule effec-
tively would provide the defendant with the best of both worlds
at the expense of the prosecution. Based on Old Chiefs motiva-
tion to reduce improper considerations, whether to prevent
unsympathetic or sympathetic juries, the symmetric application
likely applies, but no case law has determined that principle.
Additionally, Old Chief has not required the prosecution to
accept stipulations, but has shown that the government has a
number of options available to prove felon status, a stipulation
only being one." 5 The true result is that whether there is a
stipulation or not, evidence of the nature of a prior conviction
to prove status alone, generally, is unfairly prejudicial under
Rule 403 in a § 922(g)(1) case. The rule, based on Rule 403
discretion, however, cannot be adamant and still requires as-
sessment of the specific nature of the case, probative value, and
prejudicial effect." Even if there is an error, other factors
may render the admission harmless. 7 Old Chief, in effect,
233. For a discussion of the asymmetrical and symmetrical possibilities of the Old
Chief holding, and a treatment of anticipated ramifications, see generally Richman,
supra note 137.
234. Symmetrical application is more likely since the use most beneficial to the
defendant in using prior conviction evidence would be for jury sympathy, leading to
an improper consideration of character based on emotional reaction to collateral as-
pects of the presented evidence.
235. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655.
236. See supra note 222.
237. Generally, the admission will be harmless if it tends to prove another element
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merely has made explicit the obvious prejudice in permitting
the nature of prior convictions where the facts have little proba-
tive value in proving the element.
Donnie L. Kidd, Jr.
or if the remaining evidence overwhelmingly shows guilt so that no increase in the
risk of unfair prejudice can be attributed to a subsequent conviction. See supra notes
223 and 231.
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